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NOTES
Administrative Law-Due Process Standards for Quasi-Judicial
Proceedings of Municipal and County Agencies
Quasi-judicial proceedings1 conducted by administrative agencies
have traditionally varied from regular judicial proceedings in the use
by agencies of less formal and more flexible procedural regulations
than those used in fully adversary proceedings.' Procedural informality
has been particularly characteristic of quasi-judicial proceedings con-
ducted by municipal and county agencies. 3 Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Board of Aldermen4 raised the issue of whether a municipal
body conducting a quasi-judicial proceeding may exercise discretion
as to compliance with its own procedural rules. In a decision with im-
portant procedural implications for all local governmental agencies in
the state, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that due process con-
siderations required compliance with procedural rules in effect at the
time the proceeding was conducted.5
In Humble, plaintiff acquired options to purchase or lease three
adjoining lots in Chapel Hill. The lots were in a district zoned to
permit construction and operation of service stations upon approval of
a special use permit by the Board of Aldermen. 6 Humble's application
for such a permit was jointly considered by the Aldermen and the Chapel
Hill Planning Board at a duly advertised public hearing as required
by the ordinance. 7 Immediately after receiving testimony in favor of
1. A distinction is made between administrative agency proceedings that are
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory in nature and proceedings that are quasi-legislative or rule-
making in nature. For an explanation of the basis on which this distinction is made see
Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive Analysis,
53 N.C.L. RPv. 833, 838-39 (1975).
2. See generally Daye, supra note 1.
3. See Note, Board of Zoning Appeals Procedure-Informality Breeds Con-
tempt, 16 SynAcusa L Rnv. 568 (1965).
4. 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974).
5. Id. at 467-68, 202 S.E.2d at 135. The litigation involved two additional issues.
A standing challenge by the Board of Aldermen was decided in Humble's favor with
recognition by the court that a "prospective vendee" under contract to purchase property
may properly apply for or appeal the denial of a variance or special use permit related
to such property. Id. at 464-65, 202 S.E.2d at 133-34. Humble's "inadequate stand-
ards" attack on the validity of the ordinance provisions governing special use permit de-
cisions was rejected. Id. at 471, 202 S.E.2d at 138.
6. Id. at 461, 202 S.E.2d at 131.
7. Chapel Hill, N.C., Ordinance Providing For The Zoning of Chapel Hill and
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and in opposition to the issuance of a special use permit, the Aldermen
voted unanimously ,to deny Humble's application. They did not, how-
ever, refer the application to the planning boards as apparently re-
quired by the ordinance.9 Upon petition by Humble, the Superior
Court of Orange County issued a writ of certiorari and subsequently
sustained the Aldermen's decision. Humble appealed, the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals affirmed, 10 and certiorari was granted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court.
Humble argued that the application denial was arbitrary and a
deprivation of due process from both a procedural and an evidentiary"
standpoint. The procedural attack was based upon a contention that
the ordinance required a referral to the planning board after the public
hearing for an advisory recommendation before the Aldermen could
Surrounding Areas, § 4-B, June 10, 1974. (The Chapel Hill zoning ordinance has been
extensively amended since Humble applied for a special use permit in 1971. Conse-
quently, the ordinance sections cited herein do not coincide with the sections cited by
the court in the Humble opinion, but the relevant provisions are identically worded in
both versions.)
8. 284 N.C. at 465, 202 S.E.2d at 134.
9. The Chapel Hill zoning ordinance authorizes the issuance of special use per-
mits by the Aldermen for specified uses and under specified conditions "after joint hear-
ing with the Town Planning Board and after Planning Board review and recommenda-
tion." Section 4-B-i-a. The Aldermen are directed to "consider the application and
said recommendation and either grant or deny the Special Use Permit requested." Sec-
tion 4-B-1-g.
10. 17 N.C. App. 624, 195 S.E.2d 360 (1973).
11. 284 N.C. at 468, 202 S.E.2d at 135. The Board of Aldermen made a finding
of fact that Humble's proposed service station would increase traffic hazards and endan-
ger public safety. Id. at 469, 202 S.E.2d at 136. The court agreed with Humble's con-
tention that this finding, upon which the application denial was based, was unsupported
by competent evidence. The validity of flexible requirements as to the type of evidence
which may be received in a quasi-judicial proceding was affirmed by the court's holding
that N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-317, -318 (1974) (repealed by Ch. 1331, § 2, [1973] N.C.
Sess. Laws 703, effective July 1, 1975), which required that state agencies to which it
applied must comply with rules of evidence as applied in the superior and district courts,
did not apply to county and municipal agencies. Notwithstanding this latitude as to the
receipt of evidence, the court relied heavily upon the stringent standards established in
Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963), in requiring that
crucial findings of fact be supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.
284 N.C. at 468-71, 202 S.E.2d at 136-37. The Jarrell evidence standards were derived
from N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1974) (repealed by Ch. 1331, § 2, [1973]
N.C. Sess. Laws 703, effective July 1, 1975), imposed in the context of a quasi-judicial
determination of a "legal" or "property" right. It appears that the court in Humble ex-
tended the Jarrell standards to apply whenever the nature of the proceedings is quasi-judicial, regardless of the nature of the right involved. 284 N.C. at 470, 202 S.E.2d at
137. The evidentiary portion of the court's decision may, however, be influenced by
the repeal of the statutes on which the decision rests and the enactment of the North
Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (Supp.
1974), effective February 1, 1976. It is noteworthy that the new Act expressly excludes
municipal agencies from its coverage. Id. § 150A-2(1) (Supp. 1974). See Daye,
supra note 1, for a thorough description and interpretation of this Act.
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either grant or deny the application.12
The Aldermen argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that the
ordinance provisions meant that a referral to the planning board must
be made before issuance but not before denial of a permit application.
The Supreme Court rejected this construction 13 and held that com-
pliance with the referral provision was required by both due process
and equal protection considerations.' 4 Referral to the planning board
was viewed as a procedural safeguard designed to insure that every ap-
plicant for a special use permit received the same careful, impartial
consideration.' 5 The court ordered the permit denial set aside and a
de novo consideration of Humble's application by the Board of
Aldermen. 16
The strict procedural standards applied by the court in reviewing
this administrative action stand in marked contrast to the highly def-
erential review of local government actions demonstrated in past
decades. 17  There -has, however, been very little prior North Carolina
litigation concerning the competence of a local government administra-
tive agency to depart from its own procedural rules and regulations.' 8
12. 284 N.C. at 465, 202 S.E.2d at 134.
13. The court did not discuss its recent affirmation of the proposition that
"[w]here an issue of statutory construction arises, the construction adopted by those who
execute and administer the law. . . is entitled to 'great consideration,' . . . . It is said
to be 'strongly persuasive' or even 'prima facie correct'." MacPherson v. City of Ash-
ville, 283 N.C. 299, 307, 196 S.E.2d 200, 206 (1973) (citations omitted).
14. 284 N.C. at 467-68, 202 S.E.2d at 135.
15. Id. at 467, 202 S.E.2d at 135.
16. Id. at 471, 202 S.E.2d at 138. This remedy should allow the agency to bet-
ter serve the public interest by providing a "second chance" when the decision is substan-
tively correct but improperly reached. It may be argued that the de novo approach is
too burdensome for applicants. Particularly in the land use context, delays caused by
the improper denial of an application may be fatal to either complex financial arrange-
ments or to the commercial timing of business decisions. It would be anticipated, how-
ever, that agencies will make a good faith effort to comply with this decision. In addi-
tion, future applicants who are improperly denied a permit will have a better chance for
favorable resolution of the conflict in the lower courts. It is also probable that the court
would readily utilize the harsher remedy of ordering that a permit be issued in response
to an unreasonable denial. See In re Application of Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 426, 178 S.E.2d
77, 81 (1970).
17. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. City of Goldsboro, 149 N.C. 128, 62 S.E. 905 (1908).
The court labeled damnum absque injuia the damage of a plaintiff whose elm trees, be-
lieved by the city to pose a potential threat to the city sewer system, were to be removed
by the city without notice or hearing. The court's language illustrates the high level
of deference then accorded local government actions. "[O]ur courts will always be most
reluctant to interfere with these municipal governments in the exercise of discretionary
powers, conferred upon them for the public weal, and will never do so unless their action
should be so clearly unreasonable as to amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse of
their discretion." Id. at 134, 62 S.E. at 908.
18. Keiger v. Board of Adjustment, 281 N.C. 715, 190 S.E.2d 175 (1972), invali-
dated an ordinance amendment attempted without compliance with notice procedures
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One limitation observed by courts in other jurisdictions on agency
deviation from its own rules is the well-settled administrative law prin-
ciple that administrative procedure must embody basic due process
guarantees.1 9 Due process requirements have, however, generally been
interpreted less stringently in the administrative as compared to the
judicial arena.2 ° Even when such basic due process guarantees as
notice or an opportunity to be heard are not involved, however, the
prevailing view in administrative law is that, as a general rule, agencies
engaged in quasi-judicial functions do not have discretion to waive,
suspend, or disregard validly adopted procedural rules.21 There are
recognized exceptions to this general rule where the deviation is not
arbitrary, is made in the interest of justice,22 or results in harmless
error.
2 3
One important aspect of Humble Oil & Refining Co. is its de-
parture from prior North Carolina case law concerning the criteria for
determining the applicable procedural standards for agency determina-
tions. Earlier cases involving the general issue of administrative agency
procedural standards applied more stringent standards when a vested
property right was involved.24 The court in Humble gives quite limited
consideration to the nature of the right involved. It is the quasi-judicial
nature of the proceeding that is stressed at several points in the opinion
as precipitating the imposition of specified standards.2 5 To the ex-
tent that the nature of the proceeding replaces the technical nature of
the right being adjudicated as a determinant of the procedural require-
specified by the ordinance and required by the enabling act. In re Application of Ellis
also involved an amendment adopted without compliance with ordinance provisions, but
this issue was not decided. The court ordered issuance of a permit that had been denied
despite a stipulation that all ordinance requirements for the permit had been met. It
was in the context of the exercise of "unguided discretion" by the Commissioners in de-
ciding whether to grant or deny an application, not in the context of deviation from
an existing procedural rule, that the court in Ellis required the Commissioners to "pro-
ceed under standards, rules, and regulations, uniformly applicable to all who apply for
permits." 277 N.C. at 425, 178 S.E.2d at 81.
19. 2 AM. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 351 (1962).
20. E.g., id.
21. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974); Yellin v. United States, 374
U.S. 109 (1963); Vitareli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Coleman v. City of Gary,
220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942); State ex rel. Independent School Dist. v. Johnson,
242 Minn. 539, 65 N.W.2d 668 (1954).
22. American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970).
23. Olin Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 919 (1952); Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
24. Compare Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963)
with Craver v. Board of Adjustment, 267 N.C. 40, 147 S.E.2d 599 (1966).
25. See note 11 supra.
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ments to be imposed, this decision has ramifications not only for
special use permit proceedings, but for all quasi-judicial proceedings.20
The probable applicability of this decision to all quasi-judicial proceed-
ings is further supported by the constitutional base on which the court
required the Aldermen to comply with the ordinance provision for a
referral to the planning board.2 7  If due process requirements are
satisfied only by adherence to procedures outlined in the ordinance in
the special use permit context, there is no apparent reason to preclude
similar requirements in other quasi-judicial proceedings.
The primary analytical difficulty with the Humble opinion is the
resulting uncertainty about the reach of the procedural compliance
requirement. Must an agency comply only with those procedural rules
designed to provide procedural safeguards for fundamental rights? Al-
ternatively, is compliance with all procedural rules required?" A
rigid due process requirement of compliance with all procedural rules
would be a broader and more rigid requirement than has been gen-
erally imposed.29 Such a broad requirement could lead to slavish ad-
herence to procedural rules for the sake of uniformity per se and may
well prove detrimental to the purposes that administrative bodies are
uniquely designed to serve: efficiency, speed, volume, flexibility, and
informality.8" On the other hand, a due process requirement of com-
pliance with procedural rules designed to safeguard fundamental rights
is fully justified and in accord with the weight of administrative law
authority from other jurisdictions.31
Even if the opinion is interpreted to require compliance only
26. This analytical innovation should simplify the case law in zoning cases by di-
minishing the importance of technical distinctions between various types of zoning deci-
sions which have a dubious relationship to the importance of the interest involved.
The scope of proceedings viewed as falling within the quasi-judicial category will
also influence the scope of the Humble decision. A well-reasoned opinion in Fasano
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 576, 507 P.2d 23 (1973), characterizes a zoning
change as a judicial function rather than accepting the "legislative" label traditionally
applied to this type of action. Acceptance of the rationale of the Fasano opinion would
greatly expand the proportion of local government decisions that would be viewed as
quasi-judicial and thus be subjected to the more stringent procedural requirements of
Humble.
27. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
28. An affirmative response to this inquiry could be reached by reference to lan-
guage used by the court, "Mhe Alderman must 'proceed under standards, rules, and
regulations uniformly applicable to all who apply . .. .' [A] board of aldermen may
not violate at will the regulations it has established for its own procedure; it must comply
with the provisions of the applicable ordinance." 284 N.C. at 467, 202 S.E.2d at 135.
29. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
30. See Daye, supra note 1, at 845.
31. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
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with procedural safeguards designed to protect fundamental rights,
there is some ambiguity as to what specifically the court viewed in
this case as a fundamental right. It seems obvious that the Aldermen
could legitimately amend the ordinance in the future to delete the
provision for a referral to the planning board so that referral per se
would not constitute a fundamental right. Because the court viewed
the purpose of the referral provision to be the assurance of careful and
impartial consideration of all applications, it may be postulated that
the fundamental right to be protected was the right to uniform treat-
ment with respect to those procedural rules that protect the basic
fairness of the ultimate decision. This interpretation is more plausible
than the alternative that due process demands compliance with all pro-
cedural rules.3 2
Ambiguity about the proper scope of procedural compliance
could have been avoided by a mandatory-directory analysis of the
referral provision of the ordinance in lieu of the due process analysis
used by the court. An accepted distinction in statutory construction
is that failure to comply with a mandatory provision renders the pro-
ceeding to which the provision related illegal and void, whereas com-
pliance with a directory provision is not necessary to the validity of the
proceeding.3 3  In the absence of a statutory stipulation that a given
provision is mandatory, the basic criterion by which a distinction is
made between mandatory and directory provisions is the achievement
of the underlying legislative purpose. The function of this distinction
is to avoid the exaltation of form over substance.3 4 The mandatory-
directory approach thus facilitates a desirable 5 case-by-case examina-
tion of the important competing interests 6 involved, with attention
focused upon the specific interest of the applicant that may be ad-
32. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra for an analysis of why this result
would be undesirable.
33. E.g., Gann v. Harrisburg Community Unit School Dist., 73 I1. App. 2d 103,
218 N.E.2d 833 (1966); Younker Bros., Inc. v. Zirbel, 234 Iowa 269, 12 N.W.2d 219
(1943); Mullen v. DuBois Area School Dist., 436 Pa. 211, 259 A.2d 877 (1969).
34. Mullen v. DuBois Area School Dist., 436 Pa. 211, 216, 259 A.2d 377, 880
(1969).
35. But see Note, 16 SvxAcusE L. REv., supra note 3.
36. See Daye, supra note 1. Professor Daye enumerates the purposes that admin-
istrative bodies are uniquely designed to serve as efficiency, speed, volume, flexibility,
and informality. Id. at 845. Competing interests are identified as "fairness considera-
tions-equitable treatment of persons in like circumstances, notice, opportunity to par-
ticipate, regularized process, articulated reasons for agency action and overall 'ration-
ality' in agency process." Id. A perceptive discussion of the need for and method of




versely affected and upon alternative means of protecting that interest.
Thus, mandatory-directory analysis may result in broader compliance
with procedural rules than would be demanded by due process.
Given the facts of Humble Oil & Refining Co., a mandatory-
directory analysis would have probably yielded the same results reached
by the court through due process analysis. The advantage of the man-
datory-directory analysis would have been a more precise articulation
of the specific circumstances under which compliance with procedural
rules is required. The disadvantage of the approach used by the court
is that a cautious, overlybroad interpretation of the scope of the pro-
cedural compliance standard may well lead to the exaltation of form
over substance.3 7
On balance, this decision makes a significant contribution to the
development of administrative law for municipal and county agencies
in North Carolina. The dramatic increase in ithe number of cases
adjudicated by administrative agencies38 accentuates the importance
of assuring procedural fairness for parties who appear before quasi-
judicial tribunals. The sensitivity demonstrated by the court toward
the protection of procedural fairness, if tempered with recognition of
the uniquely flexible and informal nature of administrative actions by
local governmental agencies, should lead to constructive resolution of
issues not definitively decided by this case.
WENDELL HARRELL OTT
Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy in the Juvenile Courts
The right to be free from double jeopardy, as guaranteed by the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution,1 is an integral part of
the Anglo-American system of justice. "Fear and abhorrence of govern-
37. Similarly, if an agency finds the burden of a rigid and overly-broad procedural
compliance standard excessively onerous, a not unlikely reaction would be to delete by
amendment the provision in question whenever the provision was not a minimum re-
quirement of due process. The imposition of rigid standards designed to enhance pro-
cedural protection of applicants could thus ironically lead to minimum rather than max-
imum procedural protection.
38. See Hanft, Some Aspects of Evidence In Adjudications By Administrative
Agencies in North Carolina, 49 N.C.L. REv. 635, 638-39 (1971).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... .
1975]
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mental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the
oldest ideas found in western civilization."2 The United States Supreme
Court recognized the fundamental nature of this right in Benton v.
Maryland,3 a 1969 decision which made the fifth amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy applicable to state criminal prosecutions
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Breed
v. Jones4 the Supreme Court was presented with the question whether
the prosecution of an individual in an adult criminal tribunal after an
adjudicatory proceeding in juvenile court was violative of the double
jeopardy prohibition.5 A unanimous Court6 held that the guarantee
against double jeopardy is violated in such a case.7 By so holding, the
Court continued its pattern of selectively incorporating procedural rights
and assured another safeguard for youths in state juvenile court sys-
tems.8
On February 9, 1971, the State of California filed a petition in the
juvenile court for the County of Los Angeles alleging that respondent
Gary S. Jones, a seventeen-year-old minor, had committed an act that, if
performed by an adult, would have been in violation of the California
robbery statute.' The petition further alleged that Jones was therefore a
person described by California Welfare and Institutions Code section
60210 and was thus within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. At a
subsequent adjudicatory or jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court
found that Jones had committed the robbery and that he was a person
described by section 602.11 At a dispositional hearing12 held on March
2. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
3. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
4. 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).
5. Id. at 1781.
6. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for the Court.
7. 95 S. Ct. at 1791.
8. Those constitutional and procedural safeguards already guaranteed by the
Court are the right to notice, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination,
the right to confrontation and cross-examination, and the right to a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. See text accompanying notes 32-48 infra.
9. 95 S. Ct. at 1781.
10. When the petition was filed, California Welfare and Institutions Code section
602 (West 1966) provided:
Any person under the age of 21 years who violates any law of this State or
of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this State de-
fining crime or who, after having been found by the juvenile court to be a
person described by Section 601, fails to obey any lawful order of the juvenile
court, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such
person to be a ward of the court.
(A 1971 amendment lowered the jurisdictional age from twenty-one to eighteen. Ch.
1748, § 66, 1971 Cal. Stats. 3766.)
11. 95 S. Ct. at 1782.
12. At the time of the filing of the petition, CAL. WhLF. & INsT'NS CODE § 702
(West Supp. 1968) set out the procedure for the dispositional hearing.
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15, 'the juvenile court judge found that Jones was not amenable to the
rehabilitative facilities of the juvenile court' 3 and that he would recom-
mend prosecution of Jones as an adult. 4 At the next hearing the court
certified Jones to be tried as an adult.15
Jones then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in juvenile court,
contending that the adjudication under section 602 and the subsequent
transfer to superior court placed him in double jeopardy. His petition
was rejected. 6 Habeas corpus relief was likewise denied by the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal.' The California Supreme Court denied Jones'
petition for a hearing.' 8 Jones was then tried in superior court and was
found guilty of robbery in the first degree.' 9
-In December 1971, Jones, through his mother as guardian ad
litem, filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California, reasserting his claim of
double jeopardy.20 The district court refused to accept Jones' conten-
tion that jeopardy attached at his adjudicatory hearing and denied his
petition.21 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding
that jeopardy did attach at the adjudicatory hearing and that a juvenile
who is the subject of a hearing in which jeopardy has attached cannot be
retried as a minor or an adult "absent some exception to the double
jeopardy protection. 2 2
The Supreme Court affirmed,28 stating that for the purpose of
protection against double jeopardy, the adjudicatory proceeding is essen-
tially a criminal prosecution2 4 and that jeopardy attaches when the trier
of fact has begun to hear evidence. 25 The Court refused to accept a
claim that, because respondent was subject to the risk of only one pun-
13. At the time, id. § 707 (West Supp. 1967) allowed the juvenile judge to find that
the youth was not a "fit and proper subject to be dealt with" in juvenile court and to
prescribe criminal prosecution.
14. Jones v. Breed, 497 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1974).
15. 95 S. Ct. at 1783.
16. 497 F.2d at 1163.
17. In re Gary Steven J., 17 Cal. App. 3d 704, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1971).
18. 95 S. Ct. at 1783.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1783-84.
21. Jones v. Breed, 343 F. Supp. 690, 692 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
22. 497 F.2d at 1168. In so holding, the Court relied heavily on Fain v. Duff, 488
F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2396 (1975), in which the Fifth Circuit
became the first court to hold that juveniles in state court systems were constitutionally
entitled to the double jeopardy protection.
23.- 95 S. Ct. at 1791.
24. Id. at 1786.
25. Id. at 1787.
1975]
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ishment, a trial in superior court would not violate the double jeopardy
clause26 and also rejected a "continuing jeopardy" argument.2r The
Court recognized that their decision would mean that, in most cases,
a state must insure that a transfer decision be made prior to the adjudi-
catory hearing.28 It concluded, however, that assuring juveniles the con-
stitutional safeguard against double jeopardy would aid rather than hin-
der the system and would further the objective "that to the extent fun-
damental fairness permits, adjudicatory hearings be informal and non-
adversary. 29
The standard of fundamental fairness as applied to the juvenile
courts has its origins in Kent v. United Statesf0 In that case the Supreme
Court held that a District of Columbia juvenile statute must be interpret-
ed as encompassing certain constitutional rights and that the adjudica-
tory hearing must "measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment."'31 Kent was a portent of the landmark decision in In re
Gault.32 In that case the Court held that fundamental fairness" requires
that each alleged delinquent be entitled to the following procedural
guarantees at his adjudicatory hearing: (1) the right to notice of the
26. Id. "For, even accepting petitioner's premise that respondent 'never faced the
risk of more than one punishment,' we have pointed out that 'the Double Jeopardy
Clause ... is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not
punishment."' Id., citing Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970).
27. 95 S. Ct. at 1788. The concept of "continuing jeopardy" has "never been
adopted by a majority of the Court." Id., citing United States v. Jenkins, 95 S. Ct. 1006,
1013 (1975).
28. 95 S. Ct. at 1789. The Court reasoned that such a requirement would be
helpful, as it would eliminate a dilemma in which many youths find themselves. The
problem arises in this context: if a transfer is allowed after the adjudicatory hearing, the
youth who has cooperated has already given the prosecution his testimony and defenses
before trial in the adult tribunal. On the other hand, a youth who is uncooperative may
face both an unfavorable adjudication and dispositional recommendation within the
juvenile court system. Id. at 1791.
29. Id. at 1791.
30. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Court first dealt with denial of due process to
minors in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), though the juvenile court system was not
involved. The Court reversed the murder conviction of a fifteen-year-old because of a
violation of due process in obtaining his confession. The defendant's age prompted the
Court to take "special care in scrutinizing the record," for the juvenile cannot be
expected to react in the same fashion as would a mature adult. Id. at 599. Fourteen years
later, the Court used its Haley rationale in reversing the murder conviction of a fourteen-
year-old in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
31. 383 U.S. at 562. "Fundamental fairness," a term quoted with approval by the
Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970), is used interchangeably with the
phrase "due process and fair treatment."
32. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. Actually the phrase "due process and fair treatment" was employed. Id. at 30.
See note 31 supra.
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charges against him as well as timely written notice of the hearing,3 4 (2)
the right to counsel, 5 (3) the privilege against self-incrimination,3" and
(4) the right to confrontation and cross-examination.3 7
Gault was a response to an idealistic "civil" juvenile court scheme
that was initiated at the turn of the century1 to dispense "personalized"
justice in a manner similar to a parent administering guidance to his
child.39 Gault acknowledged that the system had fallen short of its stated
goal,4" noting in particular the high crime rate among juveniles,41 the
the high incidence of recidivism,42 and "[d]epartures from established
principles of due process [which] frequently resulted not in enlightened
procedure, but in arbitrariness. '43 In fact, the "civir' nature of the
proceedings had previously been asserted as the rationale for denying
constitutional and procedural rights guaranteed to adult criminal de-
fendants,44 including freedom from double jeopardy.45
A fifth procedural right was later guaranteed to juveniles in In re
34. 387 U.S. at 33-34.
35. Id. at 41.
36. Id. at 55.
37. Id. at 56-57.
38. Illinois, in 1899, was the first state to adopt a new system of courts exclusively
for juveniles. ILL. LJws 1899, §§ 1-21. At that time, the Chicago Bar Association
reported that
[Tihe fundamental ideal of the Juvenile Court law is that the state must step
in and exercise guardianship over a child found under such adverse social or
individual conditions as to develop crime... It proposes a plan whereby
he may be treated not as a criminal or one legally charged with crime, but
as a ward of the state ....
Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. FA~MLY L. 151
(1961).
39. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function
and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 9-10. This approach is summed up in the latin phrase,
parens patriae, a concept that has its roots in the medieval English chancery courts. See
Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens Patriae," 22 S.C.L. Rv.
147 (1970).
40. A 1967 presidential study came to the same conclusion. See PREsIDENT's
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, TAsK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YoUTH CRIME, 7-9 (1967).
41. 387 U.S. at 20 n.26.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. at 18-19.
44. See, e.g., In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924); In re Magnuson, 110
Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205,
183 P.2d 282 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229 N.W.
205 (1929); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), appeal dismissed, 289
U.S. 709 (1933) (per curiam); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 P. 609 (1907).
45. People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A.2d 914 (1958); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M.
140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); In re Smith, 114 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952); State v.
Smith, 75 N.D. 29, 25 N.W.2d 270 (1946).
1975]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
Winship40 when the Court held47 that children are constitutionally
entitled to the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in delin-
quency hearings. 48 However, the trend toward full constitutional rights
for juveniles stopped with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,49 in which the
Court stated that there is no right to trial by jury in juvenile proceed-
ings.50
In assuring the sixth right to those in the juvenile court system, 1
the Breed Court engaged in a two-step analysis. It first considered
whether the juvenile proceeding could be differentiated from a criminal
prosecution for the purpose of the safeguard against double jeopardy.5 2
Concluding that it could not,53 the Court then examined whether the
assurance of the right to be free from double jeopardy so diminished the
juvenile court's "assumed ability to function in a unique manner"' that
the right should not be incorporated.55 Dealing with the problem in this
fashion, the Court utilized the same analytical process employed in
Gault, Winship, and McKeiver. In Gault and Winship, the Court char-
acterized the juvenile court proceedings as criminal for the purpose of
each right in question 56 and determined that the incorporation of each
46. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
47. Id. at 368. The Court first had to incorporate explicitly this safeguard for
adults though "it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a
reasonable doubt is constitutionally required." Id. at 362, 364.
48. The Court first faced this issue in In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968) (per
curiam), but never reached the merits of the case and remanded to the state court for
reconsideration in light of Gault. In DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969) (per
curiam), the Court similarly declined to rule on the question, finding that resolution of
the issue would not be appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
49. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
50. See note 58 and accompanying text infra. The right to jury trial question had
been previously raised in In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968) (per curiam), and
DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969) (per curiam), but the Court refused to rule
on the issue in Whittington, for it never reached the merits of the case. See note 48
supra. DeBacker was held to be an inappropriate case for a resolution of the jury trial
issue because the adjudicatory hearing had taken place prior to the effective date of
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held the right of jury trial applicable
to the states.
51. It might be argued that the Court did not fully incorporate the right. See text
accompanying notes 59-65 infra.
52. 95 S. Ct. at 1785-87.
53. Id. at 1786. In so finding, the Court reiterated the conclusion reached in Gault
that the juvenile is subject to substantially the same loss of liberty as an adult and also
faces similar societal stigma. Since the juvenile encounters the same "potential conse-
quences" as does the adult accused, he suffers the same "heavy pressures and burdens
... "Id.
54. Id. at 1787, citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 547.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 1787-91.
56. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-67 (right to standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 35-36 (right to counsel); id. at 49-50
(privilege against self-incrimination); id. at 56 (right to confrontation and cross-
examination). Gault did not discuss similarities in the juvenile and criminal court
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
right would not interfere with the functioning of the system in the
desired manner. 5r The right to trial by jury was denied in McKeiver
when the Court found that the possible advantages were outweighed by
the fact that such a guarantee might "remake the juvenile proceeding
into a fully adversary process and [would] put an effective end to what
[had] been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective
proceeding. '.8
The Court's mode of analysis in Breed was therefore consistent
with previous cases. However, one way in which Breed might differ
from those prior cases is the way the Court appeared to anticipate
situations in which fundamental fairness would not require the protec-
tion against double jeopardy that they enunciated. The holding in Breed
is limited to those situations in which a juvenile is prosecuted in trial
court after an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court.59 The holding,
coupled with the following language from the case, gives the impression
that there may be some situations in which the right to be free from
double jeopardy may give way to the desired operation of the juvenile
court system:
If there is to be an exception to that proteotion in the context of
the juvenile court system, it must be justified by interests of society,
reflected in that unique institution, or of juveniles themselves, of
sufficient substance to render tolerable the costs and burdens
...which the exception will entail in individual cases.60
There are three basic situations in juvenile proceedings that might
involve the issue of double jeopardy. 1 Breed is an example of one
situation: the prosecution of a minor in a criminal trial for the same acts
that already were examined in an adjudicatory juvenile hearing. Another
possibility is waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court after the start of
processes in analyzing the right to notice, as the standard for a constitutionally adequate
notice is the same in a civil or criminal proceeding. Id. at 33.
57. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366-67 (right to standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 32-33 (right to notice); id. at 35, 38 n.65
(right to counsel); id. at 51-52 (privilege against self-incrimination); id. at 56-57 (right
to confrontation and cross-examination).
58. 403 U.S. at 545. The Court gave a total of thirteen reasons for its decision. Id.
at 545-51. The rationale of McKeiver has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Note,
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38 BROOVLYN L. REV. 650
(1972); Note, When Is a Criminal Trial Not a Criminal Trial?-The Case Against Jury
Trials in Juvenile Court, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 126 (1971).
59. 95 S. Ct. at 1791.
60. Id. at 1788.
61. See Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 266, 278-311 (1972).
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an adjudicatory hearing and a subsequent transfer to criminal court."2
Finally, a minor's acts might be the subject of a second adjudicatory
hearing in juvenile court, if the first hearing was terminated in some
manner favorable to the accused. 8
In light of Breed's position as to the moment jeopardy attaches, the
first two situations are now functionally the same for the purpose of
double jeopardy determinations. Because jeopardy is said to attach when
the juvenile court begins to hear evidence,"4 it does not appear to matter
whether the adjudicatory hearing reaches a conclusion before the case is
transferred; if evidence is heard, that would seem to be enough to
prevent a second episode in criminal court.
As to a second adjudicatory hearing after a favorable termination,
logic as well as fundamental fairness dictates that this second juvenile
hearing not be permitted. If the original adjudicatory hearing puts a
youth in jeopardy, so should the second. No court faced with this factual
situation since the Gault decision has allowed a second hearing."" Thus,
despite the possibility of an "exception," there does not seem to be a
context in which one could arise.
Breed is therefore analytically consistent with the approach taken
by the Supreme Court in selectively incorporating rights for youths in
the juvenile court system. Rather than merely granting juveniles all of
the rights already guaranteed to adults accused of crime, the Court has
considered each safeguard separately and has determined (through the
two-step analysis) whether the states will be required to furnish that
safeguard. Although this technique has been cited as particularly suited
for the setting of juvenile justice,"6 each time the Court guarantees
another right, the inconsistency of the entire approach is further empha-
sized. Justice Black, concurring in Gault, saw the illogic of first stating
that a youth in juvenile court faces the same risk as does an adult, and
then denying the juvenile the same constitutional and procedural guar-
antees that the adult enjoys: "[it would be a plain denial of equal
protection of the laws-an invidious discrimination-to hold that others
subject to heavier punishments could, because they are children, be
62. Nearly all jurisdictions permit this procedure. Id. at 297.
63. See, e.g., Richard M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1971).
64. 95 S. Ct. at 1787.
65. Rudstein, supra note 61, at 279.
66. See Dorsen and Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, FAMILY
L.Q., vol. 1, no. 4, 11-12 (Dec. 1967).
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denied these same constitutional safeguards."6 7 As each right is consid-
ered by the Court and the juvenile process is said to be indistinguishable
from a criminal trial for the purpose of that right, the methodology of
selective incorporation in the context of the juvenile court system be-
comes increasingly difficult to justify.
CHARLES B. WAYNE
Constitutional Law-The Decline of Male Chauvinism?
The Supreme Court once stated that woman is destined for an
inferior role in the societal scheme of things, that she is properly placed
in a class by herself, and that the law of the Creator deems that she
perform the duties of wife and mother and no other.' In the years
since, the Supreme Court has softened its "romantic paternalism"
toward the "weaker" sex and now views woman essentially as man's
equal.' This evolution has not been without its difficulties, however,
and even the current Supreme Court stance on sex discrimination is
obscure. The principal difficulties seem to be the determination of the
standard3 with which to judge the discrimination in such cases and a
determination of how stringently that standard will be applied.
Stanton v. Stanton4 is the most recent Supreme Court exposition
on sex discrimination and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.5 In an almost unanimous decision6 the Court held that a
Utah statute which fixed the age of majority at eighteen for girls and
67. 387 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., concurring). The same arguments were made by the
dissenters in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 557-63.
1. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872).
2. This evolutionary change is examined in Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term-Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hnv. L. REv. 1 (1972). See also Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969); Note, Constitu-
tional Law: The Equal Protection Clause and Women's Rights, 19 Loy. L. RaV. 542
(1973); Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical
Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489 (1972).
3. See text accompanying notes 14-25 infra.
4. 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975).
5. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. This section is the principal vehicle used by
litigants to challenge statutes that allegedly discriminate against females on the basis of
sex.
6. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
1975]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
at twenty-one for boys could not, under any standard, survive an attack
based on equal protection. On the surface, the treatment of the sex
discrimination issue in Stanton is charaoteristic of recent Supreme Court
holdings involving equal protection; yet, when analyzed, Stanton seems
to be another step forward in toughening the approach of the Court
toward statutory classifications which afford different treatment of the
sexes.
Thelma Stanton, the plaintiff, and her husband James, the defend-
ant, obtained a divorce in Utah in 1960. At that time the court
awarded custody of the two Stanton children7 to plaintiff and, in a
separate agreement, provided that defendant was to pay a certain
sum per month for each child as "child support." Defendant discon-
tinued these payments when his daughter turned eighteen in 1971.
Plaintiff then moved in the divorce court for judgment in her favor
ordering support of the child after she attained the age of eighteen.
The court, under the provisions of the Utah majority statute," con-
cluded that defendant was not obligated to support his daughter beyond
the age of eighteen although he was obligated to support his son until
age twenty-one.
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, plaintiff argued that the
statute was invidiously discriminatory and denied equal protection of the
laws. The Utah court held that the statute was not unconstitutional,
that the different treatment of men and women was founded on a
reasonable basis, and that some of our ancestors' "old notions" on the
fundamental differences between the sexes were viable today and should
continue to prevail.10 These "old notions" formed the rationale of the
state court's decision and included the beliefs that it is man's primary
responsibility to provide a home, that it is a salutary thing for him to
get a good education before he undertakes those responsibilities, that
girls tend to mature physically, emotionally and mentally at an earlier
age than boys, and that girls generally tend to marry earlier. Thus,
the court concluded that there was "no basis' upon which the majority
7. The two children were Rick who was five and Sherri who was seven. 95 S.
Ct. at 1375.
8. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953). The statute reads: "Period of mitority.-
The period of minority extends in males to the age of twenty-one years and in females
to that of eighteen years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage." The Court
determined that section 15-2-1, which has little legislative history, was applicable due
to the Utah court's determination that support money is for the benefit of "minor" chil-
dren. 95 S. Ct. at 1375-76.
9. 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974).
10. Id. at 318-19, 517 P.2d at 1012.
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statute could not be justified and that plaintiff was not entitled to sup-
port money for her eighteen-year-old daughter.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the Reed" test
the Utah majority statute violated the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. Justice Blackmun explained -that the "old
notions" cited by the Utah court did not justify the different treatment
imposed by the statute. He related:
A child, male or female, is still a child. No longer is the female
destined solely for the home.., and only the male for the market-
place and -the world of ideas. Women's activities and responsibili-
ties are increasing and expanding.... If a specified age of minority
is required for the boy in order to assure him parental support
while he attains his education and -training, so, too, it is for the
girl .... [l]f the female is not supported so long as the male, she
hardly can be expected -to attend school as long as he does, and
bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-
typing society has long imposed. 12
The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that the age-sex differential
embodied in the Utah majority statute was unconstitutional.'"
Long before Stanton, the Supreme Court's approach to a clas-
sification providing for different treatment of the sexes was to examine
the statute and determine if there was a "rational basis" for the legisla-
tive categorization.' 4 If there was such a basis, the statute was valid.
This approach was the traditional or passive review standard which
was designed and intended to preserve state legislative autonomy with
as little interference from the judiciary as possible. 15
Another test developed to cover other situations in which the
11. See text accompanying notes 29-31 infra.
12. 95 S. Ct. at 1378.
13. The case was remanded to determine whether once the age-sex differential was
eliminated, the appellant was entitled to the support money for Sherri between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-one. The appellant argued that the common law should apply
and that the age of minority should end at twenty-one for both boys and girls. She
cited UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-1 to -13 (1953) which provide that every man and
woman shall support his child and that "child" means son or daughter under the age
of twenty-one. The appellee urged that the inequality is to be remedied by treating
males as adults at eighteen. This age would correspond with the right to vote and other
privileges of adulthood. In any event, the appellant may have won her lawsuit but it
remains distinctly possible that she will not be entitled to the support money. See 95
S. Ct. at 1379.
14. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) (where the
fourteenth amendment was initially limited to racial discrimination). The clause was
soon expanded to include any denial of equal protection. See also Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
15. See generally Note, 58 VA. L. REv., supra note 2.
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Supreme Court deemed that more than legislative reasonableness was
required to uphold different statutory treatment. Thus, the "strict
scrutiny" test was designed to place the statute into active review and
force upon states the burden of showing a "compelling interest" for
certain classifications that invidiously discriminated. In order for strict
scrutiny to be applied, the discrimination must involve a "fundamental
right," or the classification upon which the discrimination rests must
be "suspect". Accordingly, the Supreme Court has denoted that
religion,'0 associational freedom, 17 work,' 8 voting,'0 procreation,20 and
travel 2' are all fundamental rights while race,22 lineage,23 and alienage 24
are inherently suspect categories. 25
A classification based on sex, however, has never been declared
by a majority of the Supreme Court to be inherently suspeot.21 This
refusal has resulted in application of the passive review standard-a
standard that has not once overturned a sex classification. In fact,
the only bright spot for women's rights in the years between the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment and 1971 was the passage of the nine-
teenth amendment giving women the right to vote.28
Despite this bleak history, in 1971 Reed v. Reed2 ) became the first
Supreme Court case to declare a statute providing for different treat-
ment of the sexes invalid under the equal protection clause. The case
16. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
17. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
18. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
19. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
20. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
21. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
22. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 191-92 (1964).
23. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
24. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915).
25. The Court has also implied that in certain circumstances poverty and possibly
even wealth are suspect categories. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 17 (1956). But cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
26. The closest the Court has come to declaring sex as a suspect classification was
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where a plurality held that such a cate-
gorization was inherently suspect. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
27. In Stanton the Court held that the statute was invalid under any test but a
Reed standard was applied. 95 S. Ct. at 1377, 1379.
28. For examples of the Supreme Court's treatment of the sex classification dur-
ing these years see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872).
29. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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involved a challenge to a provision of the Idaho probate code which
gave preference to males over females when persons otherwise of the
same entitlement applied for appointment as administrator of a de-
cedent's estate. The Court proposed that this different treatment,
based upon the sex of the applicant, "establishes a classification subject
to scrutiny."30  Although the Court did not say what type of scrutiny
it would employ, the standard of review noticeably differed from the
traditional, passive review standard. Contrary to the test actually ap-
plied, the Reed Court quoted language from prior cases which seemed
to dictate the use of a rational basis test in sex discrimination cases;
nonetheless, the Court seemingly applied a standard that was more
means-focused in that the purposes, rather than the basis, of the statute
were the subjects of the Court's review.31 The consequence was that
the Court had somewhat hesitantly and muddily broken from the
passive review standard.
Frontiero v. Richardson32 followed the Reed breakthrough, with
a plurality of the Court holding that a sex classification was inherently
suspect83 The Court in its opinion noted that Reed gave "implicit
support' for a determination of suspectness and that strict scrutiny in
combination with a Reed analysis of the statutory means or objectives
resulted in the statute's invalidity. Frontiero then was another positive
step by the Court toward, at the most, a declaration of sex suspectness
or, at the very least, a standard of review that involved more than
minimal scrutiny.
30. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
31. The Reed Court determined that "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation. . . ."' Id. at 76, quoting Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (where the Court said it was applying the passive
standard of review). For a discussion of the means-focused approach see Gunther, su-
pra note 2. For a discussion of the various types of tests see Note, Constitutional Law
-Mandatory Maternity Leave Termination and Return Provision of School Boards Vio-
late the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 DRAXE L. Rnv. 690
(1974).
32. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (where a statute was invalidated that made it easier for
a serviceman to claim his wife as a dependent than for a servicewoman to claim her
husband similarly).
33. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White joined in declaring that sex
was suspect. Justice Stewart concurred but would not declare suspectness stating only
that a sex classification was invidiously discriminatory. This statement left open the
possibility that he may yet be persuaded to hold suspectness. Justices Blackmun, Powell
and Chief Justice Burger seemed to believe that the Equal Rights Amendment would pro-
vide a solution and deferred for the time being any decision of suspectness. Id. at 678,
691-92. The Frontiero decision reversed a court of appeals finding that had rested on
the application of a Reed standard. See Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D.
Ala. 1972).
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Although Reed and Frontiero seemed to indicate that the Supreme
Court would no longer tolerate sex discrimination and that the next
step in the evolution would be a majority declaration of suspectness, the
cases between Frontiero and Stanton present a confusing array of
differing applications of the passive and active review standards.84 The
result of this conflict was confusion in the federal courts (as well as in
the Supreme Court itself) over which standard was applicable. Ac-
cordingly, several lower federal courts held during this period that a
sex classification is inherently suspect; 5 others continued to apply a
standard of passive review 6 while still others concluded that the proper
test is somewhere between passive and active review." The Reed-
Frontiero legacy, in any event, appears to be the impetus for future
Supreme Court decisions despite the haziness of the Supreme Court's
approach in other cases of the seventies. 8 Stanton, indeed, seems to
capsulize this legacy.
The trend toward close scrutiny of a sex classification is evident
in Stanton. Although the Court purports to apply a Reed standard,
the test actually used is tighter than the standard in Reed and, in
evolutionary terms, is nearer to a close scrutiny-suspect category type of
review. 9 There are several reasons for this conclusion.
34. Compare Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (where a discriminatory tax
scheme was upheld) and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (where the dissenting
justice points out that the majority is retreating from the strict review required by Reed
and Frontiero) with Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975) (where the
Court applied a Frontiero standard and upheld a lower federal court's decision that used
a strict scrutiny approach).
35. Johnson v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Wiesenfeld v. Secre-
tary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975); Stem v. Massachusetts Indem. and Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp.
433 (E.D. Pa. 1973); O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
36. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Pendrell
v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Smith v. East Cleveland, 363
F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La.
1973); Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973).
37. Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973); Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d
1295 (1st Cir. 1972).
38. As an example of this new impetus, compare Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961) with Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975). See also Justice Marshall's dis-
sent in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (where he foresees a stricter
application of the passive review standard-a "balancing test" approach); Note, 58 VA.
L. REv., supra note 2.
39. Note that the Stanton case and a sex classification, in general, meet the defini-
tion of "suspectness" conveyed in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973): "[tjhe class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of




First, according to Reed, an application of an intermediate, means-
focused approach involves an analysis of the majority statute's purpose,
which must have a fair and substantial relation to the different treatment
the statute provides for eighteen-year-old girls and for eighteen-year-old
boys. 40 However, instead of focusing upon the purpose of the Utah
majority statute-that purpose being the grant of adult status to
eighteen-year-old girls while at the same time postponing the majority
age grant to boys until they reach the age of twenty-one-the Court
looks solely to the legislative reasoning behind the majority statute's
purpose.41 This approach is characteristic of active review, which com-
pels the state to proffer an extraordinary reason or interest to justify
its different treatment of the sexes. Indeed, in the Stanton case, if the
Court had strictly adhered to the Reed balancing test,42 they would
have found a fair and substantial relationship; in fact, the "old notions"
summarily dismissed by the Court do have credence even today.43
The Supreme Court, moreover, placed great importance on the
fact that the majority statute itself provided that marriage terminated
minority. 44 Notwithstanding the fact that if minors of any age or of
either sex get married there is a greater need for them to succeed to the
rights of adults and that that need should supersede the corresponding
rights of other minors, the Court neglected to examine this purpose of
the provision. It instead focused upon the state's interest in having
such a statement in a majority statute and impliedly found that the
state's reason for including it, together with the "old notions," were
not compelling.
40. In Reed the object of the probate statute was the administrative convenience
in simplifying the determination of executors of estates. 404 U.S. at 76.
41. The state interests referred to are the "old notions" proffered originally by the
Utah Supreme Court. 30 Utah 2d at 319, 517 P.2d at 1012. Such "old notions" under
a rational basis test have in the past been upheld by the courts. See Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010
(1974). Also, since the purpose of the statute is not compared with the legislative ob-
ject, the Reed test has not been adhered to. Moreover, the "old notions" do have sub-
stantial relation to the purpose of the statute. See 1974 UTAH L. REV. 144, 165-66. Thus,
the Court apparently treats these "old notions" as "interests" of the state in enacting
the statute. The review is correspondingly tighter and more demanding than the previ-
ous sex discrimination standards.
42. The different treatment of the sexes is balanced against the purpose of having
girls become adults before boys. 95 S. Ct. at 1377-78.
43. For instance, statistics show that girls, on the average, do mature physically,
emotionally, and mentally at a faster pace than boys and that at ages eighteen to nine-
teen girls are much more likely to be married than boys. See, e.g., E. HURLOCK, CHMD
DEVELOPMENT 104-05 (5th ed. 1972); U.S. DEP'T OF COMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF U.S. 1973 at 38; TANNER, Genetics of Human Growth, in 3 HUMAN GROWTH
54-55 (J. Tanner ed. 1960).
44. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953).
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Another important court decision has dealt with a situation similar
to Stanton in which "old notions" were offered as a state interest and
in which a Reed standard perplexingly would not produce the desired
result of invalidating the statute. 45  In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby" the
court found that the reasoning behind the sex differential-the "old
notions"-would not survive a close scrutiny although a Reed test or
passive review would result in upholding the statute. That court
determined that the sex classification presented for review was inherently
suspect and felt compelled to disregard the notions of what is "proper"
for a person of either sex.47 Reed was thus rejected as a standard in
a manner akin to the Stanton Court's renunciation of the Utah sex dif-
ferential.
The seemingly tighter approach indicates that the Court is seeking
in Stanton to clarify the confusing Reed test.48 In doing so, the Supreme
Court has developed a review that is stricter than Reed in that it focuses
upon the intent of the legislature to the neglect of the purpose of the
statute. It is thus a more demanding approach-placing the burden
upon the state to explain that it has substantial reasons for promulgat-
ing such a statute.
A second reason for the conclusion that Stanton epitomizes the
Supreme Court's trend toward close scrutiny of sex categories is the
manner in which the Court reached the sex discrimination issue.
Stanton appears to be the first sex discrimination case in which the
constitutionality of a statute is considered "in the context" of another
statute.49 This "context' approach varies from the usual equal protec-
tion attack where the statute itself is the focus of the alleged discrimina-
tion. For example, Reed, Frontiero, and other key cases are all con-
cerned with a statute which itself has victimized the party, and it is al-
ways the victimized party who claims discrimination. In this regard,
45. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (where court declared
invalid a statute regulating the use of females as bartenders). But cf. Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
46. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
47. Id. at 5, 9, 485 P.2d at 533, 537, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 333, 337.
48. In Reed the language of the test is a paraphrase of the passive review standard
applied in Royster Guano; the case also cites as authority McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (where the Court applied a "close scrutiny" review because of the
fundamental right involved-the first amendment-and related, id. at 425, that the test
applied is that the unequal treatment have a "[slubstantial and rational relation to the
object of the legislation"). Therefore, when Reed is seen in the light of the Royster
Guano and McGowan opinions, one must wonder what Reed really stands for.
49. The Court states that "§ 15-2-1 in the context of child support does not survive
an equal protection attack." 95 S. Ct. at 1379 (emphasis added).
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Stanton portrays a situation where the victimized party, the Stanton's
daughter, is not a litigant nor is she entiled to the support money.50
For that reason, the Court determined that the majority statute must
be visualized in light of other statutes for it to be found discriminatory
to the appellant. In other words, the majority statute alone is not un-
constitutional but in the context of the statutory provisions for child sup-
port it is. Thus, the Court has taken its sex classification analysis one
step further, not only by allowing one who has not been victimized di-
rectly by the statute to challenge its validity, but also, for the first time,
by invalidating a statute that would not necessarily be of itself unconsti-
tutional but, when applied in conjunction with other statutes, denies
equal protection of the laws.
Furthermore, the Court reached this conclusion on shaky statutory
grounds. The majority statute comes into play solely on the basis of a
1946 case which describes support money "as compensation to a spouse
for the support of minor children."51 However, in 1957, Utah enacted
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act which specifically provides
that the parent shall support his children and that a "child" is a son or
daughter under twenty-one years of age. 52 The Court did not fully
discuss whether the 1957 Act is perhaps controlling and thus makes the
majority statutory issue moot.5 3 On the contrary, it is plainly evident
that the Court wished to decide the sex discrimination issue despite the
initial difficulties of standing and in the statute itself and despite avail-
able statutory alternatives for disposing of the case. This procedure is
indicative of the Supreme Court's willingness to carefully scrutinize
statutes that result in different treatment based on sex.
54
50. For a Utah case holding that the right to support money belongs to the parent
and not the child, see Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 228, 300 P.2d 596, 598 (1956).
51. Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 306, 172 P.2d 132, 135 (1946).
52. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-1 to -13 (1957).
53. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent felt that the Court should not be passing on
this issue. He proposed that the proper jurisdiction was in the Utah Supreme Court
where the intention of the parties first needed examination and if the term (the age
when support would cease) could not be supplied from the intent, the question was one
of interpretation of Utah statutory law. Only if section 15-2-1 were deemed the control-
ling statute, rather than the child support sections, and Utah upheld its constitutionality
could the Supreme Court hear the case. 95 S. Ct. at 1380-81.
54. See Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49
N.Y.U.L. Rv. 617 (1974). For a discussion of the interventionism of the Burger Court
and the possibility that the character of the statute and the resulting discrimination may
emotively persuade the Court to strictly scrutinize and declare invalidity rather than the
situation where if the statute is not outrageous the party attacking it would be given a
stern lecture on state legislative autonomy, see Gunther, supra note 2; Note, 58 VA. L.
Rnv., supra note 2.
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Finally, the Supreme Court, by invalidating the Utah majority
statute, has implied that a sex classification that unfairly discriminates
against either sex will not be upheld. Such a rule is contrary to the
holding in the recent case of Kahn v. Shevin 5 In Kahn a Florida
statute which permitted a tax deduction to widows but denied the same
deduction to widowers was upheld on the theory that the statute was
designed to eliminate past discrimination against women. Thus, in
reverse discrimination cases the Court appeared hesitant to invalidate a
statute which, on its face, was a denial of equal protection."
Stanton also involves reverse discrimination. While the underlying
purpose of a majority statute is the determination of the age at which
the law will no longer protect minors, the prevailing understanding of
the result of such a statute is that, at the prescribed age, the minor be-
comes an adult and receives the rights and privileges which go along
with adult status. Thus, Sherri Stanton, at eighteen, was free to make
her own contracts, marry without parental consent, sue in court in her
own name, serve as administratrix of a decedent's estate or as executrix
of a decedent's will, and enjoy all other rights granted and reserved to
adults which under the statute could not be enjoyed by boys under
twenty-one. Therefore, Sherri had the best of two possible worlds-not
only was she legally an adult capable of making her own decisions, but
also, under Utah law, was still entitled to parental support until she
was twenty-one. The Court noted this effect57 but nevertheless held the
statute invalid despite the precedent of Kahn. s Hence, the reverse dis-
crimination aspects, the statutory hurdles which could have prevented
adjudication, and the tighter use of the Reed standard all point to a
new and tougher Supreme Court stance on the issue of sex discrimina-
tion.
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that the Supreme
Court has taken a hesitant step toward a strict scrutiny standard of
review in sex discrimination cases. The extension of the Reed standard
and the cursory manner in which the Court struck down the majority
statute are indicative of an evolutionary process of deciding sex discrimi-
nation cases. However, the current stance of the Court on this issue
55. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
56. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Tax Exemption for Widows Upheld over Sex Discrimination Challenge,
53 N.C.L. Rnv. 551 (1975).
57. 95 S. Ct. at 1379.
58. An example of a case examining the reverse discrimination aspects involved
in a majority statute is Jacobson v. Lenhart, 30 Il1. 2d 225, 195 N.E.2d 638 (1964).
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remains extremely obscure in view of the conflicting precedent and
the various standards that have been employed to test a statutory sex
classification. This hit-or-miss approach is exasperating not only to
lower courts which must apply some standard but also to the victimized
litigants. If the Court intends to await the Equal Rights Amendmente9
and is simply stalling for time, as the Frontiero justices suggested, such
action is questionable and certainly contrary to the principles of Mar-
bury v. Madison6" which uphold the belief that judicial thought will
not be inhibited by tangentially related acts in the political arena.
Indeed, the Court should declare sex classifications inherently suspect
if only to clear up the confusion and variance which has resulted from
its rulings.
Stanton is a step in this direction and should have a substantial
effect on laws which make an age-sex differential. 61 It impliedly calls
for an end to the "wholly chauvinistic' attitude that has possessed the
Court for so many years. Indeed, -the time appears ripe for the death
of discrimination based on sex. This development would be welcome
and would prevent us male chauvinists from speaking with pride the
puritanical words of Justice Brewer who once said that ".... history
discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man.
He established his control at the outset . . . and this control . . . has
continued to the present. . .. [L]ooking at [the situation] from the
viewpoint of [woman's] effort to maintain an independent position
in life, she is not upon an equality."62
JAMES M. ISEMAN, JR.
59. For a discussion of the Equal Rights Amendment see Brown, Emerson, Falk
& Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YAL L.. 871 (1971); Johnston, supra note 54.
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
61. Other courts have dealt with similar Stanton age-sex differentials in statutes.
See Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972) (statute permitted juvenile court juris-
diction until age sixteen); Petty v. Petty, 252 Ark. 1032, 482 S.W.2d 119 (1972) (ma-
jority statute differential); Harrigfeld v. District Ct. of 7th Jud. Dist., 95 Idaho 540,
511 P.2d 822 (1973) (majority statute differential); Jacobson v. Lenhart, 30 Ill. 2d 225,
195 N.E.2d 638 (1964) (statute applied the two year statute of limitations to males af-
ter they reach twenty-one and to females after eighteen); Commonwealth v. Butler, 328
A.2d 851 (Pa. 1974) (criminal statute provided that women receive no minimum sen-
tences while men have set minimums). In North Carolina there may be a question of
Stanton's effect upon automobile liability insurance rates. Boys under twenty-five are
placed in a higher risk category than girls of the same age.
62. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908).
1975]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
Criminal Procedure-Protection of Defendants Against Prose-
cutorial Vindictiveness
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that states
may not place burdens on the assertion of a constitutional right that chill
its exercise by criminal defendants.1 In Blackledge v. Perry' the Court
considered whether the power of the prosecutor to charge the defendant
with a more serious crime at a trial de novo placed an unconstitutional
burden on the right of appeal. The Court found that the situation
presented an opportunity for prosecutorial "vindictiveness" and there-
fore held -that the requirement of due process precluded a prosecutor
from raising the charge.'
Jimmy Perry was charged with a misdemeanor and convicted in the
North Carolina district court. He appealed to the superior court for a
trial de novo.4 After defendant's notice of appeal was filed, the prosecu-
tor obtained a felony indictment against Perry based on the same
conduct as the misdemeanor charge. At the trial de novo defendant
pleaded guilty5 to the felony charge and was sentenced to a prison term.
1. See text accompanying notes 12-27 infra.
2. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
3. Id. at 28-29. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for the majority, with Justices
Rehnquist and Powell dissenting. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion with
Justice Powell joining in Part I of that opinion. Id.
4. The trial de novo is a part of a two-tiered court system. An inferior court-the
district court in North Carolina-has limited jurisdiction over misdemeanors and pro-
vides only non-jury trials. A defendant convicted in district court has an absolute right to
a new trial in superior court regardless of plea, judgment or sentence. The superior court
has general criminal jurisdiction and jury trial is provided. In superior court the slate is
wiped clean, and new findings of law and fact are made without regard to error in the
lower court proceedings. N.C. GENr. STAT. § 7A-290 (Supp. 1B, 1974); see Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1972); State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 173 S.E.2d 765
(1970); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970); State v. Bryant, 11
N.C. App. 423, 181 S.E.2d 211 (1971).
5. The Court's analysis of the defendant's guilty plea to the felony charge raised a
second issue which is in itself noteworthy. Prior decisions of the Supreme Court have
limited the review of convictions based on guilty pleas to the question of whether the
guilty plea was voluntary. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Relief has been denied to defendants who pleaded
guilty voluntarily even though there was a constitutional violation in the proceedings
"antecedent" to the guilty plea. Tolleit v. Henderson, supra at 265-66. In Blackledge,
however, the Court granted the defendant relief without regard to the voluntariness of
the plea because the due process violation went to the "power of the State to bring the
defendant into court" on the felony charge. 417 U.S. at 30. The Court distinguished the
prior cases on the ground that the constitutional defect in Blackledge could not be
"cured." Id. at 30-31. The remedy for the due process violation was "to prevent a trial
from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct
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On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, defendant alleged that the
practice of increasing the charge at a trial de novo violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6
The issue before the Court was whether the practice of raising the
charge against a defendant at a trial de novo presented the "hazard of
vindictiveness."7 The Court found that the prosecutor has a "considera-
ble stake" in discouraging appeals since every appeal dissipates valuable
prosecutorial resources.8 The prosecutor can "up the ante" by raising the
charge and thus be assured that few defendants will "brave the hazards
of a de novo trial."9 Because the defendant's apprehension of retaliation
will deter him from exercising his statutory right of appeal, the Court
concluded that the situation "pose[d] a realistic likelihood of
'vindictiveness' "10 and held that raising the charge at a trial de novo
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
The rationale of Blackledge v. Perry is derived from previous
Supreme Court decisions that preclude states from "chilling" the exer-
cise of constitutional rights."2 The Court has carefully scrutinized ac-
tions by states that deter defendants from exercising their rights by
penalizing those who assert them,' 3 finding some of these burdens un-
constitutional.14  Three situations in which the states have placed.
burdens on the exercise of constitutional rights have been considered.
In the first situation, a burden is placed on the assertion of a single
constitutional right. The Court has held that in this situation a state may
compel defendants to choose between asserting or waiving a constitu-
of a trial." Id. at 31, quoting Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973). Because Perry
could not be tried at all for the felony charge, the Court departed from precedent and
granted Perry relief without regard to his guilty plea.
A full discussion of the ramifications of this aspect of the decision is beyond the
scope of this note. Blackledge, however, upsets the finality of some guilty plea convic-
tions. The Court did not state what other constitutional rights are "power"-related but
indicated that double jeopardy has similar characteristics. See 417 U.S. at 31.
6. 417 U.S. at 25. The defendant also argued that raising the charge at a trial de
novo violated the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution, but the Court did not
reach this issue.
7. See id. at 27; note 31 infra.
8. 417 U.S. at 27.
9. Id. at 27-28.
10. Id. at 27.
11. Id. at 28-29.
12. See id. at 25; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968).
13. See generally 417 U.S. at 25; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
14. Some have not been struck down. 417 U.S. at 27; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412
U.S. 17, 30-32 (1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); Crampton v.
Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 212 (1971).
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tional right so long as "compelling the election [does not impair] to an
appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."'1 In
Griffin v. California0 the Court held that a prosecutor may not com-
ment to the jury on the fact that the defendant did not testify at trial.
The Court stated that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation outlawed the "inquisitorial system of criminal justice" and that to
allow the prosecutor to draw negative inferences from the defendant's
exercise of the privilege would severely undercut its meaning.1 7 In
Crampton v. Ohio,'8 however, the Court found that the policies behind
the fifth amendment privilege did not necessitate separate trials on the
issues of guilt and punishment when the decision on each is left to the
jury. The Court recognized that at a single trial the defendant may be
deterred from exercising his fifth amendment privilege in order to testify
on the issue of punishment. The defendant might, therefore, elect to
testify, thus possibly damaging his case on the issue of guilt.19 Never-
theless, since the policies behind the privilege do not preclude cross-
examination and impeachment of a defendant who takes the stand, even
though his case on guilt may thus be damaged, the Court found that the
burden placed on the defendant's right in Crampton was not unconstitu-
tional.20
In the second situation, a single burden inhibits the exercise of
more than one constitutional right. In this situation the Supreme Court
has looked solely to the effect of the burden on the exercise of the
constitutional rights involved. In Simmons v. United States2' the Court
held that a burden that compels a defendant to choose between asserting
one constitutional right or another is unconstitutional. Likewise, in
United States v. Jackson22 the Court declared unconstitutional a portion
15. Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
16. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
17. Id. at 614-15.
18. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
19. Id. at 214-15.
20. Id. at 216-17.
21. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Simmons the defendant testified at a hearing on a
motion to suppress evidence from an allegedly illegal search and seizure. His testimony
was admitted at trial against him on the issue of guilt. The Court reversed the conviction
holding that a state may not require a defendant to surrender his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in order to assert a fourth amendment right; to
compel an election between rights is unconstitutional. Id. at 394.
22. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). In Jackson the defendant claimed he was compelled to
plead guilty to a charge under the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)
(1970), since the death penalty could be imposed only by the jury. The Court found that
the punishment provision in the statute not only deterred the defendant from asserting
his sixth amendment right to jury trial but also his fifth amendment privilege not to
plead guilty. 390 U.S. at 581.
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of a statute that inhibited the exercise of the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to jury trial and fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Even though the Court found that there was a valid
purpose behind the statute, its effect on the exercise of basic rights made
the statute unconstitutional. 23
The third situation the Court has considered is that in which a state
places a burden on the right of appeal. The Constitution does not
require the states to grant appeals from criminal convictions. 24 Once
avenues of review are established, however, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment protects the defendant's free exercise of his
statutory right.25 When the right of appeal is concerned, the Court has
developed a unique standard for determining whether a burden is
unconstitutional. Instead of looking solely to the effect the burden has
on exercising the right to appeal, the Court examines the State's purpose
for imposing the burden. If the State's purpose is to deter appeals, the
actions are "vindictive" and the burden is unconstitutional. 26
The "vindictiveness" standard was first articulated by the Court in
North Carolina v. Pearce. In Pearce the Supreme Court invalidated a
higher sentence received by the defendant from the same court following
a successful appeal and reconviction. Since there was a likelihood that
the sentence was imposed in retaliation against the defendant for pursu-
ing an appeal, 28 the Court found that- the increased sentence operated as
a penalty. The Court recognized that apprehension of such retaliation
would deter other defendants from seeking appellate review and there-
fore held that due process limited judicial discretion in determining
sentences." The decision, however, was not based on the actual motives
or apprehensions of the persons involved. The Court instead drew its
conclusions from an analysis of the objective circumstances." °
The factors presenting what the Court has termed the "hazards of
vindictiveness" were explored more fully in two subsequent cases.31 In
23. 390 U.S. at 591.
24. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (1974); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684,
687 (1894).
25. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 25 n.4; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 724 (1969); see also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1966); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956).
26. See 417 U.S. at 25-26; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
27. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
28. Id. at 724-25.
29. Id. at 724.
30. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 28. The Court specifically stated that in
Blackledge there was no evidence of actual maliciousness on the part of the prosecutor.
31. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973).
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Colten v. Kentucky"2 defendant was convicted in district court and
appealed to the superior court for a trial de novo. Following his convic-
tion in the superior court defendant received a longer sentence than he
had received in the district court. The defendant in Chaffin v. Stynch-
combe83 was initially tried and sentenced by a jury and successfully
appealed his conviction. He was retried by a different jury which im-
posed a longer sentence. In both of these cases the Supreme Court found
that the increased sentence did not constitute an unconstitutional burden
on appeal.3" According to the Court, the key element of "vindictive-
ness," a motive for retaliation, was absent.
Colten turned on the fact that the court which imposed the second
sentence was different from the court imposing the first sentence.88
Unlike in Pearce, the judge at the trial de novo is not asked to do again
what he thought he had done properly the first time.30 In Chaffin, not
only were the two juries different, but the Supreme Court found that, in
general, juries do not have an institutional interest in discouraging
appeals. 7 Although in both contexts a burden is placed on appeal since
a longer sentence can result, the increase is permissible because it is not
designed to deter appeals. 8
The decision in Blackledge v. Perry is a logical extension of these
cases. The Court focused for the first time on the actions of the
prosecutor to determine if an unconstitutional burden was placed on
appeal. In order to discern whether the purpose of raising the charge
was to deter appeals, the Court examined the situation to see if it
"pose[d] a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness'.139  The elements of
vindictiveness were satisfied: 1) a penalty or burden-the increased
32. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
33. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
34. Id. at 26; 407 U.S. at 116.
35. 407 U.S. at 116.
36. Id. The Court may be right in concluding that one type of retaliatory motive
stems from the fact that the court imposing sentence has been corrected on appeal and
this factor is absent at the trial de novo. The Court, however, failed to take into account
the institutional interest in discouraging appeals that all courts have in common. The
pressure of the backlog of criminal cases could easily provide a strong motivation for
judges to discourage appeals. Even though a trial de novo is a new trial on the merits, it
is certain that the judge knows that the case is an appeal filling up his dooket. See Alpin,
Sentence Increases on Retrial After North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 427,
432-33 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Alpin].
37. 412 U.S. at 27.
38. Id. at 29; 407 U.S. at 116. In both Chaffin and Colten the Court found that the
jury and judge possess the power to determine punishment on the basis of a fresh
evaluation of the evidence and demeanor of the defendant. Flexibility in this process was
seen to serve a legitimate purpose. 412 U.S. at 32; 407 U.S. at 117.
39. 417 U.S. at 27.x.
[Vol. 54
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS
charge-resulted from the defendant's exercise of his right of appeal;40
2) a motive for retaliation was present since the prosecutor has a desire
to conserve state resources;41 and 3) the same state representative, the
prosecutor, was involved throughout the appellate procedure.42
The Court concluded that since fear of prosecutorial vindictiveness
would deter defendants from exercising their right of appeal, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment precluded the prosecutor
from raising the charge at a trial de novo.43 This absolute prohibition
against increasing the charge is a more drastic remedy than the one
fashioned by the Court in North Carolina v. Pearce.44 ]In Pearce the
Court permitted the judge to increase the sentence following an appeal if
the increase was supported by objective evidence of the defendant's
conduct ascertained subsequent to the first hearing. 45 This remedy was
purportedly designed to eliminate the motivation for retaliation.46 The
remedy may more accurately be viewed as designed to dispell the
defendant's fear of retaliation by removing the court's ability to penalize
him.47 The motivation to deter appeals may still be present, but the
method of implementing it is eliminated. Realization by the defendant
that a penalty cannot be imposed for appealing relieves the burden on
appeal.
The remedies for vindictiveness, however, do not reflect solely the
perspective of the defendant. Rather, the apprehensions of the defendant
are balanced against policy considerations that favor retaining discretion
by the party imposing the burden.48 In Pearce, for example, the Court
allowed the judge to retain some discretion in sentencing. Flexibility in
the sentencing process is balanced against the deterrent effect an in-
40. Id. at 27-28.
41. Id. at 27. The necessity of the presence of this factor is seen by the Court's
decisions in Chaffin and Colten, see text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
42. 417 U.S. at 27.
43. Id. at 28-29.
44. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that the remedy
fashioned by the majority went beyond the identified wrong. 417 U.S. at 34. He felt the
appropriate remedy would be to resentence the defendant in accordance with Pearce and
let the felony conviction stand. 417 U.S. at 39. Although the sentence a defendant
receives is the greatest deterrent to appeal, Justice Rehnquist did not take into account
the collateral consequences flowing from a felony conviction such as loss of voting rights
in some states. Resentencing the defendant would not remove these further penalties on
the defendant. See generally Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction, 23 VANr. L. REv. 929, 955-60 (1970); text accompanying notes 46-53 infra.
45. 395 U.S. at 726.
46. Id. at 725-26.
47. See 417 U.S. at 28.
48. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724.
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creased sentence has on appeal. By limiting the increase to those situa-
tions in which the defendant's conduct warrants increased punishment,
the judge can "[fit the punishment to] the offender and not merely the
crime"49 while assuring the defendant that the increase will not be
imposed vindictively.
The balance between the state's interest and the defendant's inter-
est is resolved differently when the prosecutor is involved. The policies
favoring judicial discretion and flexibility in sentencing are not applica-
ble to prosecutorial discretion in determining charges. The defendant's
apprehension of retaliation is greater in the Blackledge situation because
the prosecutor is his adversary.50 There is no way to make the power to
raise the charge conditional on a showing of a permissible purpose and
at the same time remove the penalty on the defendant that deters
appeals. While there may be permissible reasons for raising the charge
in some cases, such as the discovery of new evidence, the defendant's
apprehension of retaliation would not be dispelled. The defendant in the
Pearce situation maintains a degree of control over an increase in
sentence by his conduct.51 After the initial charge in the Blackledge
situation, however, the prosecutor and not the defendant has control
over increasing the charge.5" The fact that the prosecutor could later
justify his actions to a court and show that there was no actual vindic-
49. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
50. Justice Rehnquist noted that the prosecutor is a "natural adversary" of the
defendant but did not think that this fact would contribute to the possibility of
vindictiveness. It is rather peculiar that a judge, as in Pearce, who is presumably
impartial to the issue of defendant's guilt would necessitate greater scrutiny than a
prosecutor whose job is to obtain convictions. 417 U.S. at 32-34; see Alpin, supra note
36, at 452.
51. It is uncertain exactly what type of objective evidence is permissible to support
an increase in sentence. The Court stated that it must be "objective information
concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of
the original sentencing proceeding." 395 U.S. at 726 (emphasis added). Although this
language strongly indicates that evidence of prior conduct of the defendant coming to the
judge's attention for the first time at the second sentencing hearing would be excluded,
the Supreme Court will have to clarify this point. See Alpin, supra note 36, at 444-45.
52. The factors which would cause a prosecutor to raise the charge bear no
relationship to anything the defendant does, but depend upon external events. The
discovery of new evidence, for instance, supporting a higher charge depends upon the
thoroughness of the prosecutor's investigation. Justice Rehnquist notes that a prosecutor
may seek a lower court determination because it is expeditious even though he has the
evidence to obtain a conviction on a higher charge. 417 U.S. at 34. In each case, the
opportunity for raising the charge is not tied to any action by the defendant other than
appeal. Because the prosecutor has a great deal to gain from deterring appeals the
defendant will always view the actions as vindictive. Whereas in Pearce the defendant
could control the length of sentence by ordering his conduct accordingly, in Blackledge
the only way the defendant can be assured the charge will not be raised is to refrain
from appealing.
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS
tiveness does not remove the defendant's fear of retaliation. The defend-
ant will still view the power to raise the charge as an opportunity for
retaliation and will thus be deterred from appealing.
Although society has an interest in convicting the defendant for the
highest offense his conduct warrants, the prosecutor serves this interest
by bringing the initial charge. Once the charge has been brought, the
defendant's interest in a fair trial must be served. If a defendant is
deterred from appealing he has lost his only opportunity for a review of
the fairness of his conviction. The power of the prosecutor to raise the
charge on appeal has too grave an effect on the rights of the defendant
to give the prosecutor a second chance to promote society's interest.
The rationale of Blackledge may be applied to curtail the power of
the prosecutor to raise the charge following appeal in three contexts
outside the trial de novo:5 3 1) when the pciltor~indicts the defend-
ant for a higher charge based on the same conduct following normal
channels of appeal;54 2) when the prosecutor reindicts the defendant
under a recidivist statute calling for increased punishment on convic-
tion;5 5 and 3) when the defendant is tried on the original indictment
after successfully challenging a guilty plea conviction on a lesser includ-
ed offense."
The first two situations present the same elements of vindictiveness
found in Blackledge. The same retaliatory motive recognized in Black-
ledge is present in both. Reindicting the defendant on a higher charge
or under a recidivist statute operates as a penalty for pursuing an appeal
and the state's representative, the prosecutor, is involved throughout the
proceedings. Since the defendant's apprehension of prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness would deter him from appealing, the remedy fashioned in
Blackledge may be appropriately extended to limit the charge on retrial
of the defendant to that originally brought.5 7
53. Twenty-five states have a trial de novo system that will be affected by the
decision in Blackledge: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebras-
ka, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvan-
ia, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112
n.4 (1972).
54. Alpin, supra note 36, at 451; see, e.g., Sefcheck v. Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793
(S.D. Iowa 1969).
55. Alpin, supra note 36, at 451; see, e.g., Kansas v. Young, 200 Kan. 20, 434 P.2d
820 (1968).
56. See Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1970); Note, The Constitutionality
of Reindicting Successful Plea-Bargain Appellants on the Original Higher Charge, 62
CAr.. L. REv. 258 (1974); cf. Mullreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970).
57. In Ewell v. United States, 383 U.S. 116 (1965), the Supreme Court earlier
rejected a double jeopardy challenge to the retrying of a defendant on additional charges
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The situation in which a defendant is retried on the original charge
after successfully challenging a guilty plea to a lesser included offense
presents a different question. A plea bargain consists of a guilty plea by
the defendant in return for a moderate sentence or a conviction on a
lesser included offense. An appeal from a plea bargain is generally
limited to a consideration of the voluntariness of the guilty plea.r8
Although the likelihood of retrial on the original charge contained
in the indictment may deter a defendant from exercising his right of
appeal, it is doubtful that the state has placed any burden on the right of
appeal at all. In a sense, the plea bargain falls outside the normal
channels of the criminal process. The defendant who participates in a
plea bargain has been relieved of trial on the greater charge by pleading
guilty to a lesser offense. A successful appeal places him in the same
position that he was in prior to the guilty plea. The charge on retrial is
the same charge that initiated the proceedings against the defendant; the
prosecutor has not "upped the ante." The defendant is deterred from
appeal not because the state has imposed a burden, but because the
defendant has received a benefit that he does not want to relinquish.59
By holding that prosecutorial vindictiveness can place an unconsti-
tutional burden on the right of appeal, the Supreme Court has liberated
the concept of vindictiveness from the sentencing context. The reasoning
in Blackledge v. Perry indicates that the holding may extend beyond the
limited situation of the trial de novo to curtail the power of the prosecu-
tor to raise the charge following normal channels of appeal. Blackledge
arising from the same conduct that formed the basis for the original indictment. The
precedential effect of the Ewell decision, however, is questionable. Ewell arose prior to
the Court's articulation of the "vindictiveness" standard in North Carolina v. Pearce. In
addition, Ewell was decided on double jeopardy grounds. The Court made a distinction in
Pearce between the two claims. Even in Pearce, the Court rejected the defendant's
argument that the increase in sentence violated the double jeopardy clause. 395 U.S. at
719-21. The Court, however, went on to rule in favor of the defendant on due process
grounds. Id. at 725-26. If a case similar to Ewell were presented to the Court today, the
Court could easily find a due process violation without overruling Ewell.
58. See note 5 supra.
59. But see Note, 62 CAi'. L. REv., supra note 56. Plea bargaining presents
special problems in criminal procedure that the Court has not squarely faced. Retrial on
the original charge is a deterrent to appeal even though it does not fit into the
vindictiveness analysis. Although the defendant may be retried on the original charge
because of the actual desire of the prosecutor to secure the finality of convictions, society
has a greater interest in securing a conviction on the highest charge the evidence
supports. Unlike in Blackledge, society's interest was never fully served because of the
plea bargain. The defendant's interest is not protected since he may be deterred from
appeal. The only true benefit of plea bargaining is the fast and final disposition of cases.
Because plea bargaining is so widespread, it should be thoroughly examined by the
Supreme Court and constitutional standards should be determined.
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and other cases applying the vindictiveness standard indicate that
some burdens may be placed on the defendant's right of appeal, but that
acts of the state designed to deter appeals are unconstitutional.
Avis E. BLACK
The Statute of Frauds-Application of the Main Po.pose Rule:
Eliminating a Short Cut Through the "Corporate Veil"
The statute of frauds makes unenforceable the promise of one
person to assume the debt or to guarantee the credit of another unless
the promise or guarantee is supported by a writing signed by the
promisor.1 The chief limitation on this application of the statute is the
so-called "main purpose" or "leading object" rule, which defeats the
operation of the statute when the promisor has a personal pecuniary
interest in the transaction concerned. 2 In Burlington Industries v. Foil3
the North Carolina Supreme Court attempted to clarify what had be-
come a haphazard application of the main purpose rule to oral represen-
tations made by corporate officers, directors, or shareholders concerning
corporate debt. The opinion adhered to the classical standard for appli-
cation of the main purpose rule, rejecting any per se application of the
rule in the context of the close corporation.
The two individual defendants in Burlington, Martin B. Foil, Jr.,
and William H. Taylor, both were officers, directors, and shareholders
in the bankrupt, Colonial Fabrics, Inc., a North Carolina corporation.4
Colonial, a close corporation, 5 was organized in 1970 and achieved a
1. This provision has remained essentially unchanged since the passage of the
original statute of frauds in 1676. The act was originally titled "An Act for the
Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries." 29 CAR. II, c. 3 (1676).
2. A clear statement of the main purpose rule is found in Emerson v. Slater, 63
U.S. (22 How.) 28, 43 (1859):
[Wihenever the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to answer
for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose of his own,
involving either a benefit to himself, or damage to the other contracting party,
his promise is not within the statute, although it may be in form a promise
to pay the debt of another, and although the performance of it may inci-
dentally have the effect of extinguishing that liability.
This portion of the Emerson opinion is quoted verbatim by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Burlington Indus. v. Foil, 284 N.C. 740, 748, 202 S.E.2d 591, 597 (1974).
3. 284 N.C. 740, 202 S.E.2d 591 (1974).
4. Id. at 741, 202 S.E.2d at 593.
5. Colonial's president, E. B. Fowler, owned one-half of the stock. Defendants
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substantial degree of early success. During this early profitable period a
salesman for Burlington Industries contacted Colonial president E. B.
Fowler fIT, and they reached an agreement, subject to approval by
Burlington's credit department, for the sale of yam to Colonial. Burling-
ton's credit manager, J. H. Barnes, ran into difficulties in obtaining
financial information about Colonial. Although Fowler suggested that
Burlington could obtain Foil's personal guarantee" if credit could not be
extended on the information available, Barnes approved the agreement,
and shipment began without any prior guarantee. 7
As the result of market shifts, Colonial began to experience finan-
cial troubles. This prompted Barnes to contact Foil for the first time,
allegedly receiving assurance that Foil and Tuscarora Cotton Mill, also a
North Carolina corporation in which the individual defendants were
officers, directors, and shareholders, would stand behind Colonial's
credit. Burlington sought the execution of a written agreement guaran-
teeing Colonial's credit; however, Foil and Tuscarora refused. Ship-
ments were halted for a time but then resumed, reportedly on the
strength of further oral representations by Foil.8
The situation deteriorated and, although Colonial made some pay-
ments, its account with Burlington fell behind. During this time Barnes
met with defendant Taylor, who allegedly gave his own personal guar-
antee of Colonial's credit and at one point issued his personal check in
the amount of 25,000 dollars in lieu of a bad check Burlington had
received from ColonialY Colonial went into involuntary bankruptcy in
October 1971 and was at that time in arrears to plaintiff in excess of
55,000 dollars. Plaintiff instituted this action on the alleged oral promise
Foil and Taylor were treasurer and secretary respectively and each owned one-sixth of
the stock with the remaining one-sixth interest being held by Foil's mother. Id. at 741,
743, 202 S.E.2d at 593-94. For various definitions of "close corporations" see 1 F.
O'NArL, CLOSE Coa mOnToNs §§ 1.02, 1.07 (1971).
6. The facts indicate that Burlington's credit manager, Barnes, -knew the defendant
Foil personally and was confident of his financial position. 284 N.C. at 744-46, 202
S.E.2d 594-95.
7. It should be noted that all of the alleged personal guarantees received by the
plaintiff were received after the agreement had been approved and credit extended. This
is a strong indication that the credit was extended to the corporation rather than to the
individual defendants, and that the promises when made were collateral (within the
statute) rather than original (without the statute). Indeed this fact proves to be
determinative as to the court's holding the promises to be collateral. Id. at 754-55, 202
S.E.2d at 601. For discussion and cases on original and collateral promises in the
corporate context, see Annot., 35 'A.L.R.2d 906-(1954).
8. 284 N.C. at 745, 202 S.E.2d at 595.
9. Upon issuance of this personal check, Taylor obtained a written agreement
from Fowler acknowledging a loan in that amount from Taylor to Colonial at six and
one-half percent interest. Id. at 757, 202 S.E.2d at 602.
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of the defendants. Defendants denied the guarantee and affirmatively
pleaded the statute of frauds as a defense. The trial court directed a
verdict for the defendants and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed. 10 The supreme court, in turn affirming, adhered to the general
principle that for the main purpose rule to apply in this context, the
corporate officers, directors, or shareholders must receive some direct
personal benefit from the transaction over and above the indirect benefit
they receive by virtue of their corporate positions."
The statute of frauds provision relied on by the defendants in
Burlington is virtually identical to section 4 of the original statute of
frauds set forth in the statutes of Charles 11.12 As with other applications
of the statute of frauds, this particular provision of section 4 has raised
questions as to whether it creates more frauds than it prevents. Early
English case law made it clear that, notwithstanding the protection of
section 4, a person deceitfully making oral misrepresentations about the
credit of another would not be protected. 3
Further restriction of the sometimes harsh application of the statute
in this area still seemed necessary. It came by way of a judicial gloss first
articulated by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Nelson v.
Boynton.' 4 The opinion stated what has come to be known as the
10. 19 N.C. App. 172, 198 S.E.2d 194 (1973).
11. 284 N.C. at 749-50, 202 S.E.2d at 598.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-1 (1965) provides:
Contracts charging representative personally; promise to answer for debt
of another.-No action shall be brought whereby to charge an executor, ad-
ministrator or collector upon a special promise to answer damages out of
his own estate or to charge any defendant upon a special promise to answer
the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, unless the agreement upon
which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof,
shall be in writing, and signed by the party charged therewith or some other
person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
29 CAR. H, c. 3 § 4 (1676) provides:
[N]o action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or administrator
upon any special promise, to answer damages out of his own estate; (2) or
whereby to charge the defendant upofn any special promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriages of another person; . . . (6) unless the agree-
ment upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note
thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith,
or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
The 1828 passage of Lord Tenterden's Act, 9 Gao. IV, c. 14, § 6 (1828), a notable
British modification of § 4 of the statute of frauds enacted for the purpose of
strengthening and broadening its application, has had no effect on North Carolina law,
though it has been adopted in varying degrees by other states. For an illuminating review
of the application of this modification in one state that adopted it, see Taylor, The
Statute of Frauds and Misrepresentations as to the Credit of Third Persons: Should
California Repeal Its Lord Tenterden's Act?, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 603 (1969).
13. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789).
14. 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 396, 37 Am. Dec. 148 (1841).
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leading object or main purpose rule.'5 This approach avoids the statute
of frauds when the promisor, though incidentally guaranteeing or as-
suming the debt of another, acts to gain a personal benefit. Citing
Nelson, the United States Supreme Court applied the main purpose rule
in Emerson v. Slater.6 Emerson has become the primary authority for
application of the rule in the United States,17 and has been cited
extensively by the North Carolina Supreme Court since its first applica-
tion of the rule in 1910.' s
Despite the widespread acceptance of the main purpose rule,
courts have been unwilling to apply it when the interest of the officer,
director, or shareholder involved is no more than a general one in the
success of the corporate venture.' 9 In order for the rule to apply, the
person involved must have some "pecuniary or business purpose of his
own '20 in the transaction, which is additional to and separate from that
of the corporate entity.21 This distinction is conceptually difficult to
draw when dealing with a close corporation. Consequently, courts con-
sidering the applicability of the rule in this context have expressed
contradictory opinions, both in North Carolina 2 and elsewhere.23
In Burlington the court stated that the controlling issue was wheth-
er the main purpose rule was applicable.24 While ultimately refusing to
apply the rule, the decision clearly asserted the continuing validity of the
doctrine in North Carolina law.25 In doing so, however, the court
rejected a per se application of the main purpose rule to close corpora-
tions, distinguishing two of its decisions, Warren v. White20 and May
v. Haynes,27 on which the plaintiff relied. The importance of Burlington
15. Id. at 402, 37 Am. Dec. at 151.
16. 63 U.S. (22 How.) 28, 41 (1859).
17. For other cases upholding the rule see Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 906 (1954).
18. Dale v. Gaither Lumber Co., 152 N.C. 621, 68 S.E. 134 (1910).
19. Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 906 (1954).
20. Emerson v. Slater 63 U.S. (22 How.) 28, 43 (1859).
21. Id.
22. Note, Statute of Frauds-The Main Purpose Doctrine in North Carolina, 13
N.C.L. lRv. 263 (1935).
23. For comment on similar problems resulting from decisions in West Virginia see
Morris, The Leading Purpose Doctrine as Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 62 W. VA.
L. REv. 339, 341-47 (1960). For comment as to the problem generally see Simpson, A
Suggested Test for Application of the Main Purpose Rule Under the Statute of Frauds,
36 CAuLn. L. REv. 405, 411 (1948).
24. 284 N.C. at 749, 202 S.E.2d at 598.
25. Id. at 748, 202 S.E.2d at 597.
26. 251 N.C. 729, 112 S.E.2d 522 (1960). The defendant, sole shareholder of an
automobile dealership, hired a general manager, authorizing him to make certain
expenditures and promising to reimburse him personally if corporate income proved
inadequate.
27. 252 N.C. 583, 114 S.E.2d 271 (1960). The defendant, dominant shareholder in
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lies as much with its handling of these two earlier cases as with its
substantive resolution of the factual arguments presented.
28
The facts presented in Warren and May differ significantly from
those presented in Burlington in two aspects. First, in distinguishing the
two earlier cases, the Burlington court pointed to the virtual sole owner-
ship positions of the defendants in those cases. 29 Although the court in
Burlington refrained from stating that the dominant shareholder posi-
tion of the promisors in the earlier cases was the essential distinction,
there was heavy reliance on this fact in applying the main purpose rule
in Warren3 ° and May."' And the Burlington decision, rejecting the
application of the main purpose rule, did point out the minority share-
holder position of both individual defendants.32 Reliance on the extent
of ownership as the crucial factor leads to a per se application of the
main purpose rule to oral promises by sole or dominant shareholders.
This simple "rule of thumb" approach has been variously asserted and
abandoned by courts in other jurisdictions. 3 This approach necessarily
reduces the limited liability protection afforded by the corporate form to
a sole or dominant shareholder, and in so doing, appears to contradict
state statutory law, 34 which expresses a policy that close corporations,
even with fewer than three shareholders, will be treated the same as
other corporations under the law. If the earlier cases are distinguishable
from Burlington on this ground, then sole or dominant shareholders
should be counseled to pay particular attention to oral comments con-
cerning corporate obligations.
The second potentially important distinction from the earlier cases,
although not explicitly cited by the court in Burlington, is the indication
a development corporation, contracted for painting in a subdivision, telling the painter
that the corporate assets and his personal assets were the same and that he would
guarantee payment on the contract.
28. It is interesting to note that Justice Bobbitt authored both of the earlier
opinions cited and also joined in the court's opinion in Burlington, now as Chief Justice.
29. 284 N.C. at 748, 202 S.E.2d at 597.
30. 251 N.C. at 734-35, 112 S.E.2d at 526.
31. 252 N.C. at 585, 114 S.E.2d at 273.
32. 284 N.C. at 749, 756, 202 S.E.2d at 597, 602.
33. Morris, supra note 23.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (1965) provides:
Effect of acquisition of all shares by less than three persons.-(a) No
provision in this chapter, or in any prior act shall be construed as an indica-
tion of any legislative intention that the existence of a corporation, hereafter
or heretofore formed, is in any respect impaired by the acquisition of all of
the shares by one person or by two persons or that by such acquisition the
corporation ceases to possess any managerial boards or bodies or any capaci-
ties, powers, or authority which it would have possessed with three or more
shareholders, or that upon such acquisition the corporation becomes dormant,
inactive or incapable of acting as a corporation.
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of significant comingling of personal and corporate assets in Warren5
and May, G the very pitfall so carefully avoided by the defendants in
Burlington 7 Such comingling of assets has been cited as a primary
justification for "piercing the corporate veil" and reaching the individual
liability of shareholders. 8 The rationale for imposing personal liability
is that if the shareholders are not treating the corporation as a separate
entity, there is no justification for requiring others to do so. Although
such actions are not uncommon in the context of the close corporation,"0
they are clearly more difficult to maintain than is the simple contract
action relying on the main purpose rule, utilized in Warren and May.40
If either of these two distinctions, or both taken together, deter-
mine the application of the main purpose rule, then the complaining
creditor may be presented with a handy short cut through the "corporate
veil." Rather than attacking what may be an abuse of the corporate
entity41 to secure the shareholder's personal liability, an unscrupulous
creditor may choose to assert falsely the oral personal guarantee of the
shareholder. This possibility is precisely the abuse that section 4 of the
statute of frauds was designed to prevent.42
However, an alternative resolution may exist, given the court's
reliance on Emerson v. Slater4 3 and its special emphasis on the adoption
of the traditional application of the main purpose rule by other authori-
ties.44 Adhering to a strong classical test, the court seemed to overrule
the per se approach of Warren and May. Certainly the court did not
expressly overrule the earlier cases; in fact, the decision clearly pur-
ported to distinguish them.45 However, in light of the statutory mate-
rial cited above46 and the alternative method available for reaching the
same result in the earlier cases, 47 this interpretation may be viable.
35. 251 N.C. at 735, 112 S.E.2d at 526.
36. 252 N.C. at 585, 114 S.E.2d at 273.
37. This is evidenced by defendant Taylor's obtaining of the corporation's promis-
sory note to cover his personal check given to plaintiff in lieu of Colonial's bad check.
See note 8 supra.
38. 1 F. O'NAI, supra note 5, § 1.10.
39. Id. § 1.09a.
40. While the latter action requires little more than an allegation of promise and
appropriate testimony, the former will often rest on records and documents in the control
of the defendant and requiring considerable discovery procedures to reach.
41. For various bases for attack on corporate entity see 1 F. O'NAL, supra note 5.
42. Morris, supra note 23, at 340-41.
43. 284 N.C. at 748, 202 S.E.2d at 597.
44. Id. at 749-50, 202 S.E.2d at 598.
45. Id. at 750-51, 202 S.E.2d at 598-99.
46. See note 32 supra.
47. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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This does not mean that the main purpose rule cannot be invoked in
cases involving close corporations, but only that in order to do so, the
traditional "personal interests" test must be met.48
Although it is tempting to equate personal and corporate interests
in dealing with a close corporation, especially when all or most of the
shares are held by one person, this should not be done. If these interests
are equated, then the application of the main purpose rule to -avoid the
strictures of the statute of frauds may become virtually automatic. Since,
such an assumption of equality of interests would always provide the
necessary personal pecuniary or business interests required, the share-
holders, officers, or directors in the close corporation might be found to
have assumed personal responsibility for corporate debts because of
careless, unwitting, unintentional, or casual remarks. Neither this result
nor the potential abuse of a per se rule by desperate creditors49 is
desirable, for both seriously reduce the limited liability protection of the
corporate form for a closely held enterprise.
Interpreting Burlington to overrule Warren and May in its applica-
tion of the main purpose rule would leave the creditor with three distinct
methods for reaching a shareholder's personal assets. The first, which is
frequently employed by potential creditors of close corporations, is to
require the written personal guarantee of shareholders before advancing
credit."' The second is the already discussed course of attacking the
corporate entity. The third would be an assertion of the main purpose
rule where, in addition to the alleged oral promise, there is the requisite
"direct and personal" interest cited as necessary by the court in Burling-
ton.51 It is not unreasonable to require a creditor desiring a personal
guarantee in addition to corporate liability to get the guarantee in
writing; nor is it unreasonable to require the creditor who does not take
such action to carry the burden of proving abuse of the corporate entity
in order to reach personal assets upon dissolution. When the corporate
debtor becomes insolvent, the position of the disappointed creditor, who
fails to properly secure personal liability in advance or to gain it through
necessary litigation after the fact, is exactly that of the plaintiff in
48. A good example of the requisite personal interest in a modem context might
occur where a shareholder in a land development corporation also privately owned
property adjacent to that of the corporation. While his oral guarantee of the corpora-
tion's debt would benefit him as a shareholder, it would also benefit him personally to
the extent that the success of the corporation's development efforts would enhance the
value of his adjacent property.
49. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
50. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 5, § 2.03.
51. 284 N.C. at 750, 202 S.E.2d at 598.
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Burlington: at the head of the line for distribution of the remaining
unencumbered assets, but beyond that, subject to the losses which must
sometimes result from the risk of credit extension. The main purpose
rule should offer no more, and indeed as properly applied in Burlington
it does not.
JOHN GARRETT PARKER
